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The following scenario seems possible: a community uses concepts that play the same role in 
guiding individual actions and shaping social life as our normative concepts, and yet refer to 
something else. As Eklund (2017) argues, this apparent possibility poses a problem for any 
normative realist who aspires to vindicate the thought that reality itself favors our ways of 
valuing and acting. How can realists make good on this idea, given that anything they might 
say in support of the privileged status of our normative concepts can be mirrored by the 
imagined community? For instance, realists might claim that using our concepts is what we 
ought to do if we are to describe normative facts correctly, but people in the other community 
can truthfully say the same about their concepts, using their own concept of ought.  
A promising approach to this challenge is to try to rule out the possibility of 
alternative normative concepts in the first place, by arguing that any concepts that have the 
same normative role must share a reference as well, at least when it comes to authoritatively 
normative concepts like wrong or the all-things-considered ought. Eklund calls this 
referential normativity. But this is only the outline of a solution to the problem. The realist 
still needs to provide a metasemantic picture that supports referential normativity for the 
relevant concepts. In this paper I argue that normative quasi-naturalism offers such a theory 
of normative content that avoids Eklund's challenge.  
Quasi-naturalism has three main ingredients: (1) expressivism about normative 
discourse, i.e. the view that normative claims express desire-like mental states; (2) a 
deflationary account of certain metaphysical and semantic notions in terms of which realism 
is usually stated, such as truth and fact; and (3) naturalist realism about normativity, i.e. the 
view that normative properties are identical with, or fully constituted by, objective natural 
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properties, where such claims about property identity or constitution are understood as 
internal to normative discourse and amenable to an expressivist treatment. 
On this view, if two concepts encode the same desire-like attitudes and have the same 
social function, then they are the same concept, even if they are otherwise used in vastly 
different ways. In other words, sameness of normative role entails sameness of concepts. I 
call this conceptual normativity, to be distinguished from referential normativity, especially 
because the two need not always align: for instance, conceptual normativity arguably holds 
for etiquette predicates, but such predicates can have a different reference for different 
communities. Authoritatively normative concepts, however, exhibit both conceptual and 
referential normativity: for example, “wrong” refers to the same natural property for us and in 
any other context where it has the same normative role, where this claim about reference is 
again understood as a normative judgment. Or so the quasi-naturalist will argue. 
In developing this response to Eklund's challenge, I will rely on a hybrid version of 
expressivism according to which normative claims express both desire-like states and 
representational beliefs, and which fits into a broader contextualist semantics for deontic and 
evaluative terms (Ridge 2014). This view allows quasi-naturalists to capture the distinctive 
theses of metaphysical naturalism, and to distinguish authoritatively normative concepts from 
other normative concepts, for which realism and referential normativity do not hold true. 
At the end, I will address some objections to my proposal. More precisely, I will 
respond to Eklund's worry that even views that adopt referential normativity might not escape 
the problem of alternative normative concepts, because concepts that have slightly different 
normative roles can still be in competition in a way that undermines normative realism, and 
will address the concern that quasi-naturalism is not a form of genuine realism, given its 
expressivism and its deflationary framework. 
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1. The problem of alternative normative concepts 
Here is the scenario that Eklund (2017) asks us to imagine: 
“Alternative. There is a linguistic community speaking a language much like 
English, except for the following differences … While their words ‘good,’ ‘right,’ and 
‘ought’ are associated with the same normative roles as our words ‘good,’ ‘right,’ and 
‘ought,’ their words aren’t coextensive with our ‘good,’ ‘right,’ and ‘ought.’ So even 
if they are exactly right about what is ‘good’ and ‘right’ and what ‘ought’ to be done, 
in their sense, and they seek to promote and to do what is ‘good’ and ‘right’ and what 
‘ought’ to be done in their sense, they do not seek to promote what is good and right 
and what ought to be done.” (18) 
If Alternative is possible, Eklund argues, this poses a problem for any ardent realist about 
normativity, that is, any realist who tries to vindicate the thought that “reality itself favors 
certain ways of valuing and acting” (2017: 1). This idea seems to be undermined by the 
alarming symmetry between our concepts and the ones employed by the imagined 
community: users of those alternative concepts seem to be getting things right just as much as 
we do. To be sure, they do and say things that are “wrong,” in our sense of the term, but we 
equally do and say things that are “wrong” in their sense. And any claim we might make 
about the privileged status of our normative concepts—e.g., that using our concepts is what 
we ought to do if we are to describe normative reality correctly—can be mirrored by the other 
community, using their own normative concepts and with equal justification. 
This challenge superficially resembles the Moral Twin Earth problem raised by 
Horgan and Timmons (1991) for certain versions of naturalist realism: it similarly relies on a 
scenario where some concepts have the same normative role—that is, the same role in 
guiding practical deliberation and interpersonal advice and criticism—but are applied to 
different things. However, the two problems differ in at least two important ways. First, 
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Eklund's challenge does not rely on linguistic intuitions about sameness of meaning or 
reference, which the realist might try to debunk or explain away (see, e.g., Dowell 2016); on 
the contrary, it relies on the supposition that the relevant concepts have a different reference. 
Secondly, the problem of alternative normative concepts affects not only naturalist views that 
adopt a causal theory of reference for normative terms, but any realist view that allows for 
concepts with the same normative role and a different reference.1 
To be sure, Cornell-style realist views committed to a causal theory of reference (e.g., 
Boyd 1988) are the most obvious target for Eklund's challenge. If the reference of a 
normative term is the natural property, or cluster of natural properties, with which its use is 
causally connected in the right way, then reference can clearly come apart from normative 
role: two communities can use terms that play the same practical role in individual 
deliberation and interpersonal criticism and yet bear relevant causal links to different things 
in the world.2 But again, the problem arises for any realist view on which the reference of 
normative terms is determined in ways that have little to do with their normative role. 
This includes, for instance, Jackson’s (1998) analytic descriptivism, on which the 
reference of moral terms is determined by certain platitudes that form the core of the folk 
theory of morality: e.g., the reference of “wrong” is whatever makes true certain widely 
accepted and deeply entrenched beliefs associated with the use of “wrong.” As Eklund (2017, 
21) points out, if folk platitudes are to play this reference-fixing role, they will have to 
include substantive moral claims that apply moral terms to specific actions, states of affairs, 
 
1 Eklund’s Alternative scenario also resembles the famous missionary example used by Hare (1952) in his 
argument against naturalism. But again, Eklund’s challenge applies to a wider range of realist views, and is not 
meant to elicit intuitions about disagreement with respect to such cases. 
2 Boyd's theory of reference is more complex than this quick summary suggests: in particular, it is causal links 
that tend to bring about true predication which determine the reference of normative terms. (See Väyrynen 
(2018) for a discussion of how this affects the Moral Twin Earth problem.) However, this qualification does not 
matter much in the context of Eklund's challenge, as the view still allows for alternative normative concepts. 
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etc. (Merely structural platitudes specifying how normative terms relate to each other would 
be insufficient for this purpose.) But again, two terms can arguably have the same normative 
role while being associated with vastly different sets of such moral claims. 
Moreover, non-naturalist versions of realism are also vulnerable to this challenge if 
they posit mechanisms of reference determination for normative concepts that come apart 
from the normative role of said concepts. For instance, the view that normative terms ascribe 
certain non-natural properties because those properties are reference magnets in virtue of 
their metaphysical eliteness (Dunaway and McPherson 2016) seems to allow for scenarios in 
which certain terms refer to different properties for different communities, even while 
playing the same role in practical deliberation and interpersonal criticism. This gives rise, 
again, to a symmetry between the two communities which should alarm the realist: there 
seems to be no good way to argue that one community is objectively right and the other is 
objectively mistaken in their normative practices. 
As Eklund puts it, any realist who accepts the possibility of alternative normative 
concepts faces a choice between two unattractive options: “either accept that there are 
ineffable questions about normativity, or else accept that the importance of normative 
questions is deflated” (2017, 19). That is, the first option is to claim that, even if each 
community is using normative concepts correctly given what those concepts refer to, there is 
a further question about which set of concepts is genuinely better or privileged by normative 
reality, the answer to which will favor our concepts. However, Eklund argues, realists will 
also have to concede that this further question cannot be adequately articulated, let alone 
settled, using our normative concepts—or any other set of normative concepts, for that 
matter. In other words, it is an ineffable question. Alternatively, realists might be content to 
defend the privileged status of our normative concepts using those very concepts: for 
instance, they might claim that members of the alternative community do and say things that 
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are objectively wrong, in our sense of “wrong,” and this is sufficient for a defense of realism 
in the face of Alternative-type scenarios. But this option does not seem to properly vindicate 
ardent realism either, given that similar arguments will be available to users of alternative 
normative concepts. We are still left without a clear case for the idea that reality itself favors 
our ways of valuing and acting, and disfavors other ways of using normative concepts. 
Now, some realists will resist Eklund's dilemma. They will accept that there can be 
alternative normative concepts but will argue that the alarming symmetry between such 
concepts and ours can be broken in a way that does not take us into the realm of ineffability 
and is not deflationary. McPherson (2020), for instance, argues that some normative concepts 
are privileged because they refer to authoritatively normative properties, where this notion is 
understood in metaphysical terms. Eklund is skeptical that this kind of appeal to metaphysics 
can help realists avoid his dilemma and resolve the problem of alternative normative 
concepts, and I am inclined to agree with him, but I will not discuss this issue in the present 
paper. I am interested in exploring the other main strategy for defending realism in the face of 
Eklund's challenge, which is to deny the very possibility of alternative normative concepts. 
 
2. Referential normativity 
The most promising strategy in the face of Eklund's problem is to try to avoid it in the first 
place, by arguing that there can be no alternative normative concepts.3 This means offering a 
metasemantic picture on which concepts that have the same normative role have the same 
reference as well. Eklund uses the label referential normativity for this alleged feature of 
normative concepts.4 
 
3 More precisely, no alternative authoritatively normative concepts. More on this, below. 
4 To be more precise, Eklund suggests that realists should aim to make good on the idea that there can be non-
defectively referentially normative concepts: that is, concepts whose reference is determined by their normative 
role, and which are not empty or wildly semantically indeterminate. From here on, I will use referential 
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 Now, as McPherson (2020) and Plunkett (2020) point out, merely proposing an 
account of normative concepts that rules out Alternative-type cases seems insufficient for 
vindicating ardent realism: even if sameness of normative role entails sameness of reference, 
this does not in itself ensure that our normative concepts refer to objective features of the 
world, or that they are favored by normative reality. However, a charitable reading of Eklund 
is that he takes referential normativity to be a necessary condition for vindicating ardent 
realism in the face of his challenge, which might also be sufficient if other conditions for 
realism are met, such as genuine objectivity for normative truths.  
Here is the gloss that Eklund gives for the notion of normative role, which plays a key 
role in the idea of referential normativity and in this discussion more generally: 
“It is characteristic of normative predicates that they are fit to be used in practical 
deliberation relating to what to do; it is characteristic of such predicates that their 
application has, so to speak, practical consequences in addition to merely theoretical 
ones. They have normative roles (…) [I]t is likewise intuitive that different kinds of 
normative predicates are used differently, as far as such normative roles are 
concerned. But if one can compare normative roles, one can also judge when two 
predicates have the same normative role. Even if one cannot state in very informative 
terms what the normative role of a predicate is, one can intelligibly speak of sameness 
of normative role.” (38) 
This description of normative role might seem loose, but it has the virtue of leaving open a 
range of options for capturing this notion. For instance, an expressivist characterization of the 
practical function of normative concepts will look quite different from a cognitivist account 
 
normativity and referentially normative to mean non-defective referential normativity and non-defectively 
referentially normative. 
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of normative role, but both views will aim to capture the same intuitive feature of normative 
concepts: their role in guiding individual deliberation and interpersonal criticism.5  
One more preliminary point before introducing quasi-naturalism. Alternative-type 
scenarios only pose a problem for realism when they involve certain normative concepts, like 
the moral wrong or the all-things-considered ought. No realist should be troubled by 
scenarios in which, say, etiquette concepts have the same normative role but a different 
reference, because such concepts are not plausibly amenable to a realist account in the first 
place: we should expect their reference to vary between communities, even if they have the 
same normative role across different contexts of use. For this reason, Eklund restricts his 
challenge to thin normative concepts, but the relevant divide here is arguably not between 
thin and thick concepts, but rather between normative concepts that are authoritatively 
normative and those that are not (McPherson 2020). In any case, this is how I will understand 
the task of a view that aims to address Eklund's challenge by defending referential 
normativity: to rule out the possibility of alternative authoritatively normative concepts.  
This more precise understanding of the task also carries another important 
implication, however: the realist needs to provide a metasemantic picture that upholds 
referential normativity for authoritatively normative concepts, but also allows for the 
reference of other normative concepts to vary across different contexts of use. I will argue 
that quasi-naturalism can accomplish this twofold task. 
 
5 Moreover, various conceptions of normative role might be put to use in defending referential normativity. For 
example, one theory of normative meaning that would support referential normativity is Wedgwood's (2007) 
conceptual role semantics, which provides the framework for his version of non-naturalist realism. On this 
picture, the semantic roles of normative terms consist in certain rules that govern the use of said terms in 
practical reasoning, and these semantic roles uniquely determine the reference of normative terms: for instance, 
the basic rule for ought is that judging that one ought to ϕ rationally commits one to intending to ϕ, and the 
reference of ought is, roughly speaking, the property that makes such plans correct or genuinely choiceworthy 
(Wedgwood 2007: 80, 104, 153). Once again, however, I will set aside such alternative options for addressing 
Eklund's challenge, as my focus is on pursuing an expressivist approach to this problem. 
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3. Introducing quasi-naturalism 
Normative quasi-naturalism has three main ingredients: (1) expressivism about normative 
discourse; (2) deflationism about certain metaphysical and semantic notions in terms of 
which realism is usually stated, such as truth, fact, or description; and (3) naturalist realism 
about normativity, i.e., the view that normative properties are identical with, or fully 
constituted by, objective natural properties. In this section I will provide more details about 
each of these pieces and will explain how they fit together. 
Expressivism is, broadly speaking, the view that normative claims express desire-like 
mental states, where this is understood as a thesis about normative meaning, and not just 
about the pragmatics of normative discourse. Here I will rely on a specific version of 
expressivism, namely a hybrid view on which normative claims express both desire-like 
attitudes and corresponding representational beliefs.6 This view is well placed to account for 
the metaphysical claims of naturalist realism and can fit into a broader contextualist 
semantics for deontic and evaluative terms, a feature which plays an important role in 
properly addressing Eklund's challenge. 
Before bringing contextualism into the picture, however, let me introduce a simple 
version of hybrid expressivism (Ridge 2007, Toppinen 2013), which will do for the purposes 
of showing how expressivists can accommodate metaphysical naturalism about normativity. 
On this view, an atomic normative sentence like “Cheating on your taxes is wrong” expresses 
a relational mental state that consists in (1) an attitude of disapproval of actions that have a 
certain natural property, and (2) a belief that cheating on your taxes has that natural property. 
Such relational mental states can be realized by different combinations of desire-like attitudes 
 
6 This is in contrast to pure expressivism, according to which the semantic content of normative claims fully 
consists in certain desire-like mental states, like plans or attitudes of approval and disapproval. See, e.g., 
Blackburn (1984, 1993), Gibbard (1990, 2003), or Schroeder (2008). 
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and corresponding beliefs for different speakers. For example, “Cheating on your taxes is 
wrong,” when uttered by a utilitarian, might express an attitude of disapproving actions that 
do not maximize utility and the belief that cheating on your taxes fails to maximize utility, 
while an ethical egoist's utterance of the same sentence might express disapproval of actions 
that are not in the speaker's best interest and the belief that cheating on one’s taxes is not in 
the speaker's best interest, but both utterances will express the same relational mental state.7 
Here is how expressivism thus understood is compatible with naturalist realism about 
normativity. First, as is well known, deflationism about truth, facts, and other related notions 
allows expressivists to endorse many tenets of realism. For instance, on a deflationary 
account, truth is not a substantive property and the function of the notion of truth is merely 
expressive: it allows us to endorse and reject first-order claims in any domain of discourse, 
and to abbreviate and generalize when talking about claims that we endorse or reject. That is, 
on this picture, “It is true that p” is equivalent to p, and this equivalence schema fully 
captures the meaning of “true”. Thus, expressivists can hold that “It is true that cheating on 
your taxes is wrong,” taking this claim to simply rehearse the first-order normative judgment 
that cheating on your taxes is wrong (see, e.g., Blackburn 1984, 1993; Gibbard 2003). More 
generally, on this account, any judgment is truth-apt if it meets certain minimal conditions 
concerning its structure and its interaction with other parts of language and thought,8 and 
normative judgments do meet these conditions. Similarly, expressivists can claim that there 
are normative facts, or that normative judgments describe such facts, by relying on 
deflationary accounts on these notions. 
 
7 See Schroeder (2013), Toppinen (2013), and Ridge (2014) for different articulations of this idea. 
8 For instance, according to the version of deflationism known as disciplined syntacticism, any sentence that has 
a declarative form and is governed by sufficient standards of warrant is thereby truth-apt. See Lenman (2007) 
for a discussion of the relation between expressivism and different versions of disciplined syntacticism. 
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Moreover, expressivists can endorse claims about objective normative truths and 
facts, by taking such claims to express a particular kind of attitude. For instance, on the 
simple version of hybrid expressivism articulated above, the claim that “It is an objective fact 
that cheating on your taxes is wrong” might express a relational mental state comprising (1) 
an attitude of disapproving actions that have a certain natural property, even when 
considering scenarios in which we ourselves did not disapprove of such actions; and (2) the 
belief that cheating on your taxes has that natural property.9 
 Everything said so far about the compatibility between expressivism and realist 
commitments is familiar quasi-realist fare, and does not depend on a hybrid expressivist 
framework. When it comes to accommodating the metaphysical claims of naturalist realism, 
however, hybrid expressivism becomes particularly useful, as Bex-Priestley (forthcoming) 
has argued. Take the following naturalist thesis: 
(A) Moral wrongness is identical with failing to maximize utility.10 
(A) is both normative and metaphysical in nature, and is easily amenable to a hybrid 
expressivist treatment. To use the same simple version of hybrid expressivism, (A) can be 
understood as expressing (1) an attitude of disapproving action types that have a certain 
property, and (2) the belief that the property in question is identical with failing to maximize 
utility. Similar hybrid expressivist accounts can be given for naturalist theses about 
 
9 See Blackburn (1984, 1993) and Gibbard (2003) for similar accounts of objectivity claims, but in a pure 
expressivist framework. 
10 There is a dispute among naturalists about whether the relation between normative and natural properties is 
best understood in terms of property identity or in terms of some other relation like constitution or reduction. 
See, e.g., Brink (1989), who argues against property identity naturalism on the grounds that moral properties are 
fully realized by certain natural properties, but they could have been realized by many other sets of natural 
properties, and perhaps even by certain supernatural properties. I am setting this issue aside here because it is 
not relevant for Eklund’s challenge and hybrid expressivism can capture both kinds of metaphysical claims. 
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constitution relations between normative and natural properties, or other metaphysical 
relations that fall short of identity.11  
This is then how expressivists can endorse metaphysical naturalism about normative 
properties. But someone might wonder why expressivists should be naturalists, especially 
given that their deflationary approach to metaphysical issues seems to align them with 
quietist non-naturalist realists such as Dworkin (1996) and Scanlon (2014).  
Gibbard (2003) argues that expressivists must be naturalists, because any coherent 
planner is committed to what he calls the Natural Constitution thesis: there is a natural 
property that constitutes what is good, or what one ought to do.12 It is important to note, 
however, that Gibbard uses “natural” in a broad sense that potentially includes supernatural 
properties such as being willed by God.13 Bex-Priestley (forthcoming) offers a similar 
transcendental argument for moral naturalism, but in a hybrid expressivist framework: the 
judgement that moral properties are irreducibly normative will always involve a false belief, 
he argues, because all properties toward which we can have desire-like attitudes can be 
described in non-normative terms—or at least this is what expressivists should think, given 
 
11 To be clear, I am not claiming that only hybrid expressivism can accommodate the metaphysical claims of 
normative naturalism. Perhaps pure expressivism can also achieve this, although I am inclined to agree with 
Bex-Priestley (forthcoming) that it lacks the resources to distinguish between identity or reduction claims, on 
one hand, and mere correlation claims involving normative and natural properties, on the other: e.g., between 
“Goodness reduces to being pleasurable” and “Necessarily, things are good if and only if they are pleasurable”. 
In any case, here I am only making the positive claim that hybrid expressivism does provide a clear account of 
metaphysical naturalist claims. As mentioned before, I rely on hybrid expressivism for this reason and because it 
can fit into a broader contextualist semantics for deontic and evaluative terms, a feature which I believe plays an 
important role in properly addressing Eklund's challenge. 
12 Fundamentally, Gibbard's argument does not even depend on expressivism: anyone committed to the 
supervenience of the normative on the natural is thereby committed to the Natural Constitution thesis, he argues, 
and expressivism only plays a role here insofar as it entails supervenience. 
13 Gibbard also uses the term “prosaically factual” for the category of properties to which normative properties 
can be reduced. This is arguably a better label since it does not suggest that these must be the kind of properties 
studied by the natural and social sciences. 
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that they aim to explain the content of normative claims without relying on irreducible 
normative concepts. However, as Bex-Priestley himself acknowledges, this argument too 
only establishes that normative properties are reducible to non-normative or descriptive 
properties, rather than naturalism in a narrow sense that excludes supernatural properties.  
This being said, I believe that naturalism in the narrow sense is the most natural 
option for expressivists, for several reasons. First, naturalism fits with the original 
motivations for the expressivist project (Blackburn 1984, Gibbard 1990): the aim to provide 
an ontologically parsimonious theory of normative discourse, on which fundamentally there 
are only natural facts and our attitudes directed at those facts, but which also leaves 
normative discourse in good standing.  
Secondly, naturalism arguably has epistemological advantages over non-naturalist 
realism, given that it takes normative facts and properties to be causally efficacious: for 
instance, naturalists can better explain the reliability of our normative beliefs, by appealing to 
causal connections of the right sort between our beliefs and the normative facts. 
Thirdly, there is arguably no good reason not to be a naturalist about normativity, 
particularly if one combines naturalism with expressivism. Properly defending this claim 
would take me beyond the scope of this paper, but let me just say that none of the standard 
arguments against naturalism, like Moore’s (1903) open question argument or Enoch’s 
(2011) argument that normative properties are “just too different” from natural properties for 
naturalism to be true, seem effective against versions of naturalism that acknowledge 
important differences between normative and purely descriptive concepts, particularly the 
fact that normative concepts have a practical function that involves action guidance and 
social coordination. Such functional differences between normative and purely descriptive 
concepts can be used to explain away the intuitions behind many of these arguments against 
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naturalism. And of course, expressivism is the most salient way of articulating the idea that 
the primary function of normative concepts is practical rather than descriptive. 
One more clarificatory point. I use the term quasi-naturalism for this view that 
combines expressivism and normative naturalism not because of its deflationary framework 
or because I take it to be less than fully realist, but because it stands in contrast with 
representationalist accounts of normative meaning, such as causal theories of reference for 
normative terms or other metasemantic pictures associated with naturalism.14 For quasi-
naturalists, normative concepts are primarily individuated through their practical roles rather 
than through representational relations with the normative realm. This is what allows quasi-
naturalists to avoid the challenge of alternative normative concepts, to which I now return.15 
 
4. Quasi-naturalism as an Alternative-unfriendly view 
Quasi-naturalism can vindicate ardent realism in the face of Eklund's challenge by ruling out 
the possibility of alternative authoritatively normative concepts while allowing that other 
normative concepts, such as etiquette predicates, can have a different reference for different 
communities. Here is how this works. 
First, we need to distinguish between Conceptual and Referential Normativity: 
Conceptual Normativity (CN)  Sameness of normative role entails sameness of concepts. 
Referential Normativity (RN)  Sameness of normative role entails sameness of reference. 
 
14 Majors (2006) uses the term “quasi-naturalism” slightly differently: for him, “quasi” refers to the fact that 
moral properties are not recognized as real in virtue of their explanatory role.  
15 Quasi-naturalism resembles in some respects a view that Eklund calls presentationalism, and which he takes 
to be another salient option for addressing the problem of alternative normative concepts. The core idea of 
presentationalism is that “normativity generally is something that characterizes only our devices for representing 
the world and not what these devices stand for” (Eklund 2017, 67). However, presentationalism denies the 
existence of normative properties, while quasi-naturalism claims that normative properties do exist, even if they 
are identical with, or reducible to, natural properties, and even if their normativity simply consists in being the 
kind of properties to which normative concepts refer. 
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If a view delivered (CN), this might seem to be enough to forestall Eklund's 
challenge, because (CN) seems to make Alternative-type scenarios impossible.16 Moreover, 
the simple version of hybrid expressivism stated in the previous section upholds (CN) for the 
concepts to which it applies: for instance, if the term “wrong” has the same normative role for 
us and for the imagined community in Alternative, this is in virtue of expressing the relational 
mental state partly composed of a desire-like mental state, the expressivist will argue, which 
also entails that both communities use the same concept of wrongness.  
However, this appeal to (CN) is too quick and does not properly address Eklund's 
challenge. This is because it still seems possible that different communities use the same 
concepts but with a different reference, and that there is no good way to argue that one 
community's use of concepts is somehow privileged by normative reality. Indeed, as 
mentioned before, this is precisely the type of scenario that we should expect when it comes 
to non-authoritatively normative concepts such as etiquette predicates. A proper defense of 
realism in the face of Eklund's challenge needs to distinguish such relativistic concepts, 
which arguably exhibit (CN) but not (RN), from authoritatively normative concepts like 
wrong and the all-things-considered ought, for which both (CN) and (RN) must be upheld. 
In order to achieve this goal, I propose that quasi-naturalists rely on a more complex 
version of hybrid expressivism that fits into a broader contextualist semantics for deontic and 
evaluative terms. In what follows I will use a specific view that fits this bill, namely Ridge's 
(2014) version of hybrid expressivism, but this is meant to illustrate a more general point: it 
is the structure of Ridge's view that does the work here, rather than its details. 
The general case for contextualism is by now well-known (e.g., Finlay 2014, Ridge 
2014, Chrisman 2016, Worsnip 2019). Deontic and evaluative terms like ought and good are 
 
16 In a similar vein, Plunkett (2020, fn. 11, p. 7) suggests that the core issue raised by Alternative-type scenarios 
concerns normative concepts as such rather than concept extensions or properties. 
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used in many different ways—for instance, we can talk about what we prudentially ought to 
do, or about what we ought to do according to the standards of British etiquette, or about 
what we ought to do, all things considered—and it is implausible that such terms are 
ambiguous between these different uses. The more plausible hypothesis is that terms like 
ought and good have a unique meaning or character but different semantic contents in 
different contexts of use, in the same way that indexicals like here and I have a uniform 
character but context-sensitive contents.  
Ridge relies more specifically on a Kratzer-style contextualism for deontic and 
evaluative terms (Kratzer 2012). On this model, two parameters determine the semantic 
content of terms like ought and good in particular contexts of use: (a) a modal base, i.e. a 
body of propositions held fixed in context, or a set of worlds in which certain background 
conditions are met; and (b) an ordering source that ranks worlds in the modal base, for 
instance by how well they satisfy certain standards.  
Here is an example: “You ought to give a large part of your income to charity” will be 
true, in any context of utterance, just in case “You give a large part of your income to 
charity” is true in all of the words in the modal base that are highly ranked according to the 
ordering source. The ordering source in each context will depend on the flavor of the given 
deontic or evaluative claim. For instance, in some contexts, the ordering source might consist 
in norms of etiquette, while in another context worlds will be ranked in accordance with 
French law, and so on. 
For Ridge, authoritatively normative claims are a special subset of uses of deontic and 
evaluative terms, for which the ordering source consists in acceptable standards of practical 
reasoning. For example, “You ought to give a large part of your income to charity,” when 
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used in an authoritatively normative sense, means that any acceptable standard of practical 
reasoning would recommend that you give a large part of your income to charity.17 
It is important to note that this contextualist semantics does not entail relativism or 
any other form of anti-realism about normativity. Normative realists can adopt this semantic 
model and claim that the ordering source in authoritatively normative contexts of use consists 
in objectively acceptable standards of practical reasoning, or some similar parameter, making 
thus good on the idea that, when we make authoritatively normative claims, we are talking 
about what we really ought to do, or what is objectively wrong, rather than about what 
follows from some set of standards that we or others around us happen to accept.18 
Ridge also wants to make good on realist ideas about normative objectivity, but in an 
expressivist framework. His motivation is that authoritatively normative judgments have 
certain distinctive features that push us toward expressivism: they are action-guiding, 
intimately connected with emotions, and they allow for the possibility of radical 
disagreement. For this reason, Ridge proposes an expressivist account of the notion of 
acceptable standards: to judge that a standard is acceptable is to endorse a normative 
perspective that does not rule out that standard, where normative perspectives are understood 
as noncognitive practical stances. More precisely, standards of practical reasoning are rules 
 
17 Ridge simply uses the word normative for this category of claims, but I am restating his view in terms of 
authoritative normativity because I think we should allow that domains like etiquette and law are also normative 
in a weaker sense: they exhibit what is sometimes called formal or generic normativity (see, e.g., Copp 2005, 
McPherson 2011, Baker 2017). 
I should also note that I have glossed over some important differences between Kratzer’s and Ridge’s 
versions of contextualism. In particular, on Ridge’s view, the standards that constitute the ordering source for 
modal terms like “must” and “ought” rank actions rather than possible worlds when such terms are used in a 
normative sense. Ridge takes this feature to be an improvement over Kratzer’s model because it allows for the 
intelligibility of normative dilemmas, i.e. normative requirements to do the impossible. However, this issue is 
not particularly relevant in the context of Eklund’s challenge, so I am setting it aside here.  
18 Laskowski (2014), Fogal (2016), and Worsnip (2019) have made similar points about the compatibility 
between contextualism and realism about at least some normative claims. 
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that guide practical judgments or decisions, and to adopt a normative perspective is to have 
certain behavioral dispositions with respect to those standards, e.g., dispositions to act in line 
with certain standards, to issue certain prescriptions, to hold others accountable when they 
violate those prescriptions, etc. 
Putting these elements together, we arrive at a hybrid expressivist view on which 
authoritatively normative claims express both a normative perspective and a corresponding 
representational belief. To use the same example, “You ought to give a large part of your 
income to charity,” if used in an authoritatively normative sense, will express a relational 
mental state comprising a normative perspective and the belief that donating a large part of 
your income to charity is highly ranked by any acceptable standard of practical reasoning.19 
On this picture, both authoritatively and non-authoritatively normative concepts can 
exhibit (CN), but only the former are also referentially normative, partly in virtue of their 
noncognitive content. 
Take non-authoritatively normative concepts first. The semantic analysis of etiquette 
claims, for instance, will be purely descriptive on Ridge’s view: it will refer to what is highly 
ranked by certain locally accepted standards of behavior, without involving a normative 
perspective or any other desire-like attitude directed at those standards.20 But judgments 
about what is highly ranked by locally accepted standards of behavior also have a certain 
normative role, at least for the typical concept user: people will standardly rely on such 
judgments about social practices to guide their actions, criticize others, etc., even if these 
 
19 Ridge uses the label metasemantic expressivism for this view, because it helps explain why normative claims 
have the context-sensitive semantic contents that they do, but Finlay (2014) and Alwood (2016) have argued 
that we are still dealing here with expressivism as a theory in first-order semantics. Nothing in the present paper 
hinges on this taxonomical issue. 
20 This is compatible with holding that etiquette claims pragmatically convey that the speaker has certain desire-
like attitudes concerning the relevant standards, at least in typical circumstances. The claim here is that such 
attitudes are not part of the meaning of etiquette claims, nor do they help explain said meaning.  
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behavioral dispositions are not constitutively linked to the meaning of etiquette claims. 
Moreover, this normative role will be roughly the same for all communities using etiquette 
concepts: that is, etiquette claims will be embedded in similar patterns of behavior and social 
sanctions in all contexts of use. Thus, etiquette concepts arguably exhibit (CN): if two 
communities use certain etiquette concepts that have the same normative role, then those 
concepts are identical.21 At the same time, specific standards of etiquette will vary between 
communities, and therefore the reference of etiquette concepts will vary as well.  
For authoritatively normative concepts, in contrast, quasi-naturalism delivers both 
(CN) and (RN). Again, (CN) is easily secured by expressivism. For example, on this picture, 
judgments about what is morally wrong have a distinctive role in guiding individual 
deliberation and interpersonal criticism because they encode normative perspectives, and 
both we and the community in Alternative use the same concept of wrongness in virtue of 
this noncognitive content that is constitutively linked with the normative role of “wrong,” 
even if this content is instantiated by a different normative perspective in each case. 
Quasi-naturalism can also vindicate (RN) for authoritatively normative concepts, by 
treating questions about the reference of terms like ought and wrong as internal normative 
questions, to which normative inquiry can establish unique answers that hold true no matter 
how those concepts are used by some community or other. 
A key tool here is deflationism about reference. On a deflationary account, a question 
such as “What is the reference of ‘wrong,’ for us and in the Alternative scenario?” will be 
treated as equivalent to the normative question “What kind of actions are wrong, for us and in 
Alternative?”. To answer this question is to identify the natural features that make actions 
wrong in the two scenarios, through substantive normative theory. 
 
21 N.B.: The claim here is not that these concepts are identical because they have the same normative role. 
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Expressivists have the resources to claim that the same features make actions wrong 
in all the relevant cases, no matter how any community uses the concept of wrongness. 
Again, expressivism is not a form of relativism, not even when built into a contextualist 
framework. Ridge's hybrid expressivism, for instance, provides an account of what it is to 
think that a standard is acceptable, not an account of what makes standards acceptable. On 
this view, the truth conditions of normative claims do not make reference to our normative 
perspectives, but simply refer to acceptable standards. Moreover, as already mentioned, 
expressivists can make sense of the idea of objective acceptability—and therefore of 
objective wrongness, objective goodness, and so on—by identifying a special kind of attitude 
expressed by objectivity claims, e.g., a normative perspective that condones or rules out 
certain standards of practical reasoning even with respect to scenarios in which we or others 
adopted different normative perspectives. By adopting such resilient normative perspectives, 
we can coherently claim that terms like wrong and good have a unique objective reference. 
To be sure, normative theorizing about what kind of features make actions right, 
wrong, etc. need not always lead to objectivist conclusions. Indeed, there may be good 
reasons to adopt relativism about some normative issues. I am not claiming, then, that 
expressivism and deflationism together entail Referential Normativity about authoritatively 
normative concepts, but only that they provide a framework in which first-order normative 
arguments can be given for the idea that these concepts have a unique objective reference. 
For instance, once expressivism helps establish that we and the people in Alternative use the 
same concept of wrongness and are in genuine normative disagreement, utilitarians among us 
might argue that failing to maximize utility is the fundamental feature that makes actions 
wrong for both communities, as well as in any other social context. If this argument in 
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normative theory succeeds, then “wrong” has a unique objective reference: it refers to the 
property of failing to maximize utility in all the relevant scenarios.22 
Someone might argue that precisely the kind of scenarios imagined by Eklund, in 
which different communities use authoritatively normative concepts in vastly different ways 
and seemingly with equal justification, give us reason to reject (RN) with respect to those 
concepts. In other words, these scenarios still seem to involve an alarming symmetry between 
the two communities: whatever arguments we might offer for our judgments about the 
reference of normative concepts, it seems that members of the imagined community will be 
able to offer similar arguments for their own verdicts on this issue. 
I acknowledge that quasi-naturalism still faces a challenge here, but this is a version 
of the traditional epistemological challenge from disagreement, which all forms of normative 
realism face, rather than a metasemantic challenge about how to secure (CN) and (RN) for 
our concepts. Moreover, this epistemological challenge can only arise after the metasemantic 
challenge has been resolved, because it takes for granted that the relevant communities 
genuinely disagree on normative matters, i.e., they use the same concepts to talk about a 
common subject matter. However pressing this epistemological challenge might be for quasi-
naturalists and other realists, this is not Eklund’s challenge anymore: it has nothing to do with 
alternative normative concepts and the limits of our own conceptual framework.23 
 
22 To be clear, I do not think it likely that utilitarianism will turn out to be the correct moral theory. This is just 
an illustration of the idea that normative theorizing can secure a unique objective reference for normative terms. 
Another strategy that might allow expressivists to secure an objective reference for at least some 
normative concepts would be to adopt a constitutivist view on which certain normative truths follow from 
commitments that are inescapable for any rational agent. On the compatibility between expressivism and 
constitutivism, see Silverstein (2012) and Ridge (2018). 
23 Street (2011) argues that her Darwinian dilemma for normative realism applies to expressivist quasi-realism 
as well, and this arguably holds for all epistemological challenges to realism, including the challenge from 
irresolvable disagreement that I mention here. See Gibbard (2011) and Golub (2017b) for quasi-realist responses 
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Before moving on to other objections to my proposal, two clarifications are in order. 
First, the quasi-naturalist defense of (RN) for authoritatively normative concepts does not 
require Ridge’s sophisticated version of hybrid expressivism. Similar arguments for the idea 
that normative concepts have a unique objective reference can be made using the simple 
version of hybrid expressivism stated in the previous section, or even in a pure expressivist 
framework. The reason why I have relied on Ridge’s view here is that its contextualist 
framework allows us to easily distinguish between authoritatively normative concepts, for 
which both expressivism and (RN) hold true, and relativistic normative concepts, while 
making good on the plausible idea that terms like ought and good have core meanings that 
remain stable across authoritative and non-authoritative contexts of use.  
Secondly, I have not claimed that expressivism is the only option for naturalists who 
want to defend (RN) and rule out the possibility of alternative authoritatively normative 
concepts. Perhaps there are non-expressivist ways to achieve this. Indeed, the idea that 
naturalists can treat questions about the reference of normative terms as internal to normative 
theory has been proposed before in discussions of the Moral Twin Earth problem (see, e.g., 
Sayre-McCord 1997 or Brink 2001), and some defenders of naturalism even tie the identity 
of normative concepts to their normative role in a way that resembles the expressivist 
approach to this issue.24 I am skeptical that any of these naturalist proposals will be able to 
properly address Eklund's challenge without in effect adopting an expressivist account of 
 
to Street’s evolutionary debunking argument and a related epistemological challenge, viz. the demand to explain 
the reliability of our normative beliefs.   
24 Copp (2018), for instance, holds that we should take another community's term “wrong” to mean the same as 
our “wrong” if they are motivated to act in the same way as us in relation to using that word, even if they 
otherwise apply “wrong” in very different ways from us. See also Yetter-Chappell and Yetter-Chappell (2013), 
who suggest that naturalists can adopt a view on which moral concepts are individuated by their action-guiding 
role and phenomenal character, and therefore the same moral concepts can be used by people who otherwise 
vastly differ in their dispositions to apply those concepts to things in the world. 
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normative discourse, but this is a topic for another paper. My goal here has only been to make 
the positive case that expressivism—and more precisely, a hybrid expressivist view that fits 
into a contextualist framework—can help vindicate naturalist realism about normativity in the 
face of Eklund's challenge. 
 
5. The embarrassment of riches problem 
In the remainder of this paper, I will address two worries about my proposal. The first is a 
worry raised by Eklund for anyone who attempts to avoid the problem of alternative 
normative concepts by defending Referential Normativity: even if normative role determines 
reference, he argues, there can still be normative concepts with slightly different normative 
roles than our concepts and which refer to something else. This is a problem because the 
concepts at issue would be intuitively in normative competition with ours, and yet the slight 
differences in normative role entail that realists cannot rely on Referential Normativity to 
argue that those concepts must have the same reference as ours. Or so the argument goes. 
Expressivist quasi-naturalism is squarely within the target of this objection. As 
Eklund puts it, discussing Gibbard's version of expressivism: 
“One thing Gibbard fails to ask (…) is whether there is, instead of a unique possible 
concept that is the last ‘ought’ before action, a number of slightly different, non-
coextensive concepts each with an equal claim to be the last ‘ought’ before action, 
and different thinkers can employ different ones among these non-coextensive 
concepts.” (56-57) 
Moreover, Eklund argues, while other realists might respond to this problem by claiming that 
only some of the competing concepts with slightly different normative roles refer to genuine 
normative properties—in other words, that normative reality only supplies a reference for 
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only some of the concepts at issue25—expressivists cannot easily make such a case, given 
their aversion to metaphysical explanations of facts about truth, reference, etc. 
Eklund also mentions another response that realists might adopt in the face of this 
problem, which seems more congenial to expressivism: “provide a theory of what normative 
roles are such that expressions associated with different normative roles cannot be in 
normative competition” (2017, 58). However, he is skeptical that expressivists, or anyone 
else for that matter, can make good on this idea. 
I believe quasi-naturalists can address this worry in a way that involves elements of 
both of these responses. First, while conceding that concepts with slightly different roles can 
be in normative competition, quasi-naturalists will insist that such competition is possible 
only because the normative roles of those concepts largely overlap: that is, there can be 
genuine disagreement between uses of those concepts precisely because they play a similar 
role in guiding deliberation and interpersonal criticism and advice, which allows for the 
possibility of conflicting practical prescriptions.26 For instance, concepts with very different 
normative roles, such as our concepts of moral rightness and beauty, cannot be in normative 
competition, at least not in a way that would be relevant to debates about moral or aesthetic 
realism. 
Conversely, to the extent that two concepts do have similar enough roles, their uses 
will allow for genuine disagreement and mutually intelligible normative debate, even if those 
concepts are not identical. To take an example, think of our concept of ought, and imagine a 
community that uses a homophonic term with a similar normative role, but with a stronger 
conceptual connection to motivation and action, akin to our concept of must. While these 
 
25 This is what Eklund calls the normative sparseness reply. 
26 For canonical accounts of disagreement in attitude understood as actual or potential practical conflict, see 
Stevenson (1944), Ch. 1, and Gibbard (2003), Ch. 4. For a recent articulation of this idea that aims to avoid 
some problems faced by Stevenson’s and Gibbard’s accounts, see Ridge (2014), Ch. 6. 
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concepts have slightly different normative roles, their uses can be in genuine disagreement, 
e.g., if one of us says “We ought to give a large part of our income to charity” and someone 
in the other community says “We ought to keep most of our income to ourselves”. From an 
expressivist standpoint, concept identity only matters because it tracks genuine normative 
disagreement, and such disagreement is possible even in the absence of concept identity.  
Finally, such cases of disagreement between uses of concepts with slightly different 
normative roles pose no special challenge to normative realism, or no challenge having to do 
with the limits of our conceptual tools, ineffability, or making good on the idea that 
normative reality privileges some concepts over others. Determining the correct reference of 
“ought,” both for us and for the other community, now becomes as internal normative 
question, to be settled with the tools of normative theorizing. That is, we can make a first-
order normative case for why our claims involving “ought” are true and the claims of the 
other community are false, and this is in effect to argue that normative reality privileges our 
use of “ought”. 
 
7. Is quasi-naturalism a form of ardent realism? 
The second challenge I want to briefly discuss is most likely the reason why expressivism has 
been largely ignored as an option for addressing Eklund's challenge, both in his book and in 
the ensuing debate. This is the complaint that expressivist quasi-realism, including the 
naturalist version that I have endorsed in this paper, is not a form of genuine realism.  
There are actually two different worries here. One concerns expressivism and its 
alleged incompatibility with realist commitments. The second worry is about the deflationary 
framework of quasi-realism. Let me address them separately. 
Eklund himself argues that quasi-realism entails a form of relativism, and therefore 
cannot make good on genuine normative objectivity: 
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“A quasi-realist view (…) allows one to say that it is true that such-and-such things 
are bad whenever one has the right attitude, and that when Bad Guy believes 
something to the contrary, he believes something false. But it is clear that Bad Guy 
can with equal propriety say the corresponding things about us. Given his attitudes, it 
is semantically appropriate for him to assert that (say) torturing babies for fun is right, 
and it is then, on the quasi-realist view, equally appropriate for him to assert that it is 
true that torturing babies for fun is right; and there are no genuine facts about which 
he is mistaken.” (2017, 2-3)  
Note that this argument concerns the expressivist ingredient of quasi-realism, i.e. the idea that 
normative claims semantically express desire-like attitudes, rather than its deflationary 
account of truth, facts, etc.27 
This is an instance of a familiar complaint about expressivism, with which I cannot 
properly engage in this paper. Let me just say, though, that I take this worry to conflate two 
different questions: whether it is semantically appropriate for someone to make a certain 
normative claim, and whether it is appropriate or correct, in a substantive normative sense, 
for the person in question to make that claim. Or, as Schroeder (2014) puts it, this type of 
objection to expressivism mistakes the sincerity or assertibility conditions of normative 
claims for their truth conditions. Expressivism does entail that the sincerity conditions of 
normative claims depend on the speakers' desire-like mental states, but this is compatible 
with an objectivist account of normative truths, on which sincere or semantically appropriate 
normative claims can nevertheless be objectively false. Moreover, quasi-realists can perfectly 
well claim that there are genuine facts about who is correct and who is mistaken in cases of 
normative disagreement, or even that normative reality favors our ways of valuing and acting, 
 
27 Indeed, in fn. 6, p. 4, Eklund explicitly says that ardent realists can be deflationists. 
 27 
by relying on their deflationary account of facthood and other related notions, on which such 
seemingly metaphysical claims simply rehearse first-order objectivist commitments. 
This is where the second worry about quasi-realism typically arises: deflationism 
itself, it might be argued, cannot vindicate the existence of genuine normative facts and 
properties. Copp (2001), for instance, holds that “the central doctrine of moral realism is that 
moral predicates refer to robust moral properties” (38-39, my italics), as opposed to moral 
properties understood in a merely deflationary sense. Similarly, McPherson (2020) argues 
that ardent realism requires “an ontologically significant, non-minimalist interpretation of the 
metaphysical terminology” (11). And these are just two examples of the wide aversion to 
deflationism among self-described robust realists in metaethics.28 
Here is another way to put this worry about deflationism, focusing on the claim that 
reality itself favors our ways of valuing and acting, which is at the core of Eklund’s 
challenge. Perhaps quasi-naturalists can make good on this realist idea in some sense, by 
relying on a deflationary notion of normative reality and thereby treating this claim as 
internal to normative discourse, the argument will go, but they cannot vindicate the 
metaphysical thesis that reality, in an external sense that is independent of any normative 
perspective, privileges our normative concepts and the ways in which we put them to use. 
And it is this latter thesis that defines ardent realism.29 
 
28 One option available to quasi-naturalists might be to adopt a non-deflationary account of some of the relevant 
metaphysical and semantic notions, such as truth or property. See, e.g., Ridge (2014), who argues that his 
version of quasi-realism does not require deflationism and can be combined with a correspondence conception 
of truth, albeit one on which truth claims are understood as normative and given an expressivist account. I am 
skeptical, though, that relying on this conception of truth would allay the worries of those who think that quasi-
naturalism cannot address Eklund’s challenge because it is not a form of genuine realism. Their complaints are 
likely to be redirected at the expressivist account of truth itself. 
29 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this way of framing the worry about the deflationary 
framework of quasi-naturalism. 
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I cannot do justice to the debate about deflationism and the question of realism in the 
present paper either, but let me make two brief points. 
First, here is how things look from a deflationary standpoint: normative truths and 
facts understood in a deflationary sense are as robust as they can intelligibly be, and the same 
goes for the notion of normative reality.30 So deflationism is compatible with full-blown 
realism about any domain of facts, at least by its own lights. The fact that there is a dispute in 
metametaphysics about whether deflationism is the right account of truth, facts, reality, 
etc. does not entail that any metaethical view that adopts deflationism is thereby anti-realist, 
and more generally does not affect the question of realism in any domain of discourse.31 
Secondly, this deflationary approach to metaphysical issues does entail that there is no 
sense to be made of the idea that reality favors our ways of valuing and acting except as a 
claim internal to normative discourse, equivalent to the claim that everyone ought to use 
normative concepts as we do or to some similar normative claim. But this is as it should be, 
quasi-naturalists will insist: we cannot intelligibly demand that reality understood in a non-
normative sense favor our normative outlook, and it is a virtue of quasi-naturalism that it 
avoids such confused ideas by interpreting all metaphysical claims about normative facts, 
reality, or objectivity as organic parts of normative theory.32  
 
30 Of course, people can coherently reject deflationism and propose a different interpretation of metaphysical 
claims about normative truths, facts, reality, etc. But if deflationism is indeed the correct account of the meaning 
of terms like “true,” “fact,” etc., then there is in fact no intelligible way of using such words in a more robust 
metaphysical sense. Thanks to Max Hayward for pressing me on this issue. 
31 For example, few people would dispute that someone can be a deflationist about truth, facts, etc. and yet a 
scientific realist. It is not clear to me why deflationism is treated with much more suspicion by normative 
realists compared to realists in other domains. 
32 As Ridge (2018, 2960) puts it: “The idea that we might somehow stand outside our normative commitments 
and worry about whether they correspond to some putative normative reality which we can conceptualize 
independently of making any specific normative judgments is entirely alien to the quasi-realist approach.” And 
this idea that realist-sounding claims about objectivity or mind-independence can only be understood as internal 
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To be sure, there are significant differences between quasi-realism and other forms of 
normative realism: most importantly, an explanatory contrast that bears on central issues in 
metaethics. Quasi-realists explain the content and the distinctive nature of normative concepts 
in terms of their non-representational, practical function, rather than by appealing to 
representational relations between such concepts and normative entities. Indeed, this 
explanatory contrast is the reason why many quasi-realists themselves see their view as 
distinct from realism (e.g., Blackburn 1993, Gibbard 2003).33 
However, as I have argued in previous work (Golub 2017a, 2021), there seems to be 
no explanatory conflict here between quasi-realism and anything recognizable as a general 
notion of normative realism, at least not if we adopt a deflationary standpoint. For instance, 
we cannot define realism in terms of explanations of normative meaning that ascribe a 
substantive role to truth and reference relations understood as general semantic notions, 
because such explanations are incompatible with deflationism about truth and reference. In 
other words, if we take deflationism seriously, we will not see these explanations of meaning 
as indicating some robust metaphysical commitments (“robust realism”) that quasi-realists 
should reject, but rather as the product of confusion about the nature of truth and reference. 
For these reasons, I believe quasi-naturalists should think of their view as a form of 
realism pure and simple, and the same goes for anyone who accepts that the quasi-realist 
project might succeed. And if my arguments in this paper are correct, quasi-naturalism might 
offer the best way to vindicate ardent realism in the face of the problem of alternative 
 
to normative discourse is a recurrent theme of Blackburn’s work. See, e.g., Blackburn (1993: 156-157, 173), 
among many other places. 
33 For different versions of this idea that quasi-realism and genuine realism diverge in their explanatory 
commitments, see also Dreier (2004) and Simpson (2018), among others. 
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normative concepts precisely because it rejects a representationalist account of normative 
meaning and normative concepts.34 
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